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 Abstract 
Periodically, the ‘zone of acceptance’ within which management may use its authority to direct 
employees’ work needs to be adapted to the changing needs of organisations. This article focuses 
especially on the non-codified elements of employees’ work, such as those commonly the subject 
of ‘psychological contracts’, and considers the role of individual employee voice in the process 
of adaptation, and how it relates to more familiar forms of collective employee voice. It is argued 
that the process can be analysed as a form of integrative bargaining, and applies the framework 
from Walton and McKersie. Employee voice enters into this process by virtue of consideration 
of the respective goals and preferences of both parties. The element of employee voice may be 
very weak when new work goals and priorities are imposed unilaterally by management, and 
they may be strong when full consideration is given to the changing needs of both parties. Two 
examples from work on performance management in the public services are used to illustrate 
these processes. The article concludes with a discussion of the ways in which collective 
employee voice may help to reinforce individual level integrative negotiation. The article seeks 
to contribute to the recent work on why employers choose employee voice mechanisms by 
broadening the range of policies that should be taken into account, and in particular looking at 
the potential of performance management as one such form. 
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1. Introduction  
 
At the heart of the employment relationship lies a ‘zone of acceptance’ within which 
employees agree to let management direct their labour. This may relate to the range of tasks 
that employees are willing to undertake at management’s direction, but it may also include 
the priority to be accorded to different types of work, and the willingness to vary working 
time according to management’s requirements. Depending on how large this zone is, and 
how its boundaries are drawn, it provides organisations with varying degrees of flexibility 
to respond to changing production and market requirements (Simon, 1951). As Williamson 
(1975) and others point out, much of this flexibility derives from the ability to function 
without having to codify work obligations precisely. Nevertheless, from time to time, the 
boundaries need to be revised, a point emphasised by Denise Rousseau (1995) in her 
treatment of strategies to change the ‘psychological contract’. For her, organisations can 
induce change by communicating with their employees in order to revise their beliefs and 
expectations concerning the ‘deal’ implicit in the psychological contract1. This is an 
important observation. However, it underplays the economic nature of the exchange 
involved in the supply of labour services. 
 
Employment is both a psychological relationship, and an economic one. Its contractual 
form is chosen from among a range of alternative ways of organising transactions, such as 
independent self-employment, according to the mutual interests of the parties involved 
(Williamson, 1985). Its economic basis has important implications for how we think about 
employee voice in relation to changing, or renegotiating, the zone of acceptance, as it does 
concerning the relationship between voice in the individual-level and collective 
negotiations with management. Whereas Rousseau’s psychological contract is in essence a 
belief held by employees, and is asymmetrical because logically organisations do not have 
beliefs (Boxall and Purcell 2003), a transactional approach is symmetrical, and emphasises 
                                                 
1 . Although other writers on the psychological contract have adopted a more symmetrical approach, 
so that both employees and their organisations can be party to such a contract, Rousseau’s view 
has predominated in empirical research since the publication of her key studies (see Conway and 
Briner, 2006, and Cullinane and Dundon, 2006). 
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the importance of give and take by both parties. Although the transactional approach also 
gives a large role to informal rules and to custom, it places greater emphasis on the idea of 
there being, to varying degrees, a negotiated order in the workplace, such as that observed 
by Ram et al. (2001), and by Brown (1973). By looking at employee voice within 
performance management, this essay seeks to extend the range of voice mechanisms 
between which organisations may choose, and so contribute to the analysis of why 
employers choose particular forms of employee voice (see Willman et al 2006). 
Performance management, that is a combination of employee goal setting, and appraisal, 
frequently underpinned by performance related pay, is now widely used in British public 
sector organisations, as it is in the private sector, and it has attracted increasing interest 
within public management across the OECD countries (see OECD, 2005). More generally, 
according to the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey, appraisals now constitute 
one of the ‘main tools for evaluating and managing employee performance’ with two thirds 
of all British workplaces with 10 or more employees using them for most of their staff, with 
the proportions somewhat higher in the public than in the private sectors (Kersley et al 
2006: 87). 
 
The strategy of this paper is to analyse the individual-level renegotiation of the zone of 
acceptance by means of performance management as a form of integrative bargaining, 
drawing on the work of Walton and McKersie (1965). In this process, the quality of 
integrative bargaining is a critical variable. At one extreme, when of poor quality, and close 
to imposition by one side on the other, it is likely that the outcome has to be based more on 
compliance than freely given consent, so that motivational outcomes will be 
correspondingly weaker, and management will have to rely more heavily on monitoring 
and control mechanisms to ensure its desired performance patterns. This approach, it will 
be argued, enables one to consider the corresponding role of collective voice at the 
enterprise and industry levels. Although the zone of acceptance can be negotiated simply 
between individual employees and their managers, collective voice can make three major 
contributions to reinforce this process. It can take key distributional elements out of 
bargaining so that the individual level can focus more on the ‘win-win’ aspects of 
integrative negotiation; it can help improve the design of systems and it can enhance their 
procedural justice. These are examined in section 3. In this way, the article hopes to 
contribute to the analysis of individual employee voice within organisations. The analysis 
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will be supported by illustrations based on the work at the Centre for Economic 
Performance (CEP) on performance management.2
 
 
2. Integrative bargaining and renegotiation of the ‘zone of acceptance’ 
 
A key insight from the work on the psychological contract is to give substance to the 
processes involved in the adaptation of individual employees’ work obligations. For 
Rousseau (1995), organisations need employee consent in order to adapt the scope of the 
zone of acceptance to their changing needs, and to achieve that they need to reshape 
employee perceptions of the ‘deal’ they have with their organisation. She suggests that 
sometimes this can be by ‘drift’, the gradual change over time of job contents and employee 
perceptions of their jobs as organisations change, but management may not always control 
this process as their errors of omission as much as actual decisions can shape what comes to 
be expected, in a similar manner to the evolution of workplace ‘custom and practice’ (e.g. 
Brown 1973). However, management may also assume a more active role in trying to get 
employees to reframe their view of the contract by emphasising the changing demands on 
the organisation, which they can do by communication, consultation, involvement, and 
performance appraisal. The last of these was stressed as a means of controlling drift 
(Rousseau 1995: 178). Negotiation is not mentioned. Rousseau’s emphasis on the former 
kinds of policies may be in part the result of addressing a predominantly managerial 
audience, in which most managers do not deal with unions. But it is also the result of 
treating the psychological contract itself as a set of beliefs or expectations, rather than 
focusing on the nature of the transaction itself.3
                                                 
2. The CEP’s work on performance pay comprises studies of the Inland Revenue (Marsden and 
Richardson 1994), the civil service, hospitals and for head teachers by Marsden and French (1998) 
and more recently of classroom teachers, see Marsden and Belfield (2005 and 2006). The first 
studies were cross-sectional surveys of employee attitudes to and beliefs about their schemes. The 
school teachers’ one is a panel study started in 2000 just before the implementation of the new 
system of performance management, and followed up in 2001 and 2004. The latter study links 
replies of classroom and head teachers in the same schools, and combines these school 
performance data. 
 
3. Conway and Briner (2006) consider three strategies for change: unilateral imposition by 
management, communication, and negotiation. They stress that work on these strategies is still at a 
3
 As is well known, Walton and McKersie distinguish ‘integrative’ from ‘distributive’ 
bargaining, the latter focusing on relative shares of the pie, whereas the former focuses on 
agreeing the means to increase its size. They distinguish four stages or components of 
integrative bargaining: identifying the problem, searching for alternative solutions, 
selecting the best alternative, and commitment to implementation. Whereas the first two 
may seem relatively technical, the third, selection, involves also reference to the respective 
preferences of the two parties, or as the two authors stress, to their utility functions. The 
final one, brings us back to the issue of re-contracting and delivery by both parties, and 
hence of future credibility in any negotiation. Many of the examples Rousseau discusses in 
her chapter focus on the first component, identifying the problem, as a means of reframing 
employee expectations. Others, such as employee involvement may cover searching for 
alternatives (e.g. Rousseau, 1995: 156), but selection and implementation are very much 
within management’s bailiwick. It is surely significant that, in many of the examples she 
gives, management places great store on the idea that although external conditions and job 
content have changed, the spirit of the contract has not. In other words, there is no need to 
renegotiate the terms of employment that had been agreed to on hiring. 
 
The third stage of integrative bargaining is particularly important for revisions of the zone 
of acceptance because it takes account of the preferences of both parties. This is both the 
justification for referring to the process as one of negotiation, by which the relative 
strengths of the preferences are revealed, and an essential basis for commitment by both 
parties to the solution adopted. One can imagine that the latter two stages will assume 
greater importance the more management depends upon the knowledge and expertise of its 
employees. Indeed, the greater the knowledge asymmetry, the harder it is for management, 
on its own, to master even the first two stages: identify the problem and evaluate alternative 
solutions. Even when promoted from the ranks, managers’ technical knowledge can date 
quite rapidly, so that they become more dependent on those whose work they direct. The 
third stage also introduces the notion that the agreed solution may require compromise by 
both parties. As the solution adopted reflects the objectives and preferences of both parties, 
                                                                                                                                                     
preliminary stage, nevertheless, negotiation of psychological contracts raises some theoretical 
difficulties because it is not clear how one can negotiate over changes in beliefs.  
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one can expect it to be better adhered to that if it had been imposed unilaterally by 
management. 
 
2.1 Two examples of changing the zone of acceptance 
 
To bring out the potential role of individual integrative bargaining in changing the zone of 
acceptance, it is helpful to consider two examples, both of which are drawn from the CEP’s 
work on performance management in the British public services. The first case looks at 
changes in the zone acceptance for teachers, notably in relation to the priorities they accord 
to teaching test and non-test elements of their subjects. The second examines changes in the 
scope of the zone of acceptance in one hospital, to promote more flexible working of 
unsocial hours in order to provide better continuity of care for patients. In both cases, 
performance management provides a forum within which management can discuss issues 
related to the zone of acceptance with individual employees, and agree on some adaptation. 
Teachers illustrate the case for a highly skilled group of employees, whereas the hospital 
case covers a wider range of skills, excluding doctors, but including low-skilled employees. 
 
Education 
School teachers belong to a group of employees who exercise a high level of expertise in 
their work, particularly with regard to their subject and its teaching methods, so there is an 
asymmetry of knowledge between staff and management. Moreover, the nature of teachers’ 
work is imprecise, in the sense that there is no fixed set of procedures that lead to a specific 
result, and which can be easily monitored (Murnane and Cohen, 1986), so that simple 
monitoring and control by management will be costly. Hence, the key to managing their 
zone of acceptance will lie mostly in the way their work priorities are determined. 
 
Recent changes in management of the school system have profoundly altered the pressures 
on schools and their managers both financially and in terms of the pressures to obtain good 
pupil exam results. The latter are made public in educational ‘league tables’, and frequently 
influence parental choice. Schools now operate in a ‘quasi market’, and those which fail to 
attract sufficient students will see their student numbers and income fall (Glennerster 
2002). Thus one can expect a clash between teachers’ preferences to provide a broad 
education for their students, ‘educating tomorrow’s citizens’, and the pressures on head 
teachers to reorient priorities in the classroom towards higher student attainments in 
5
national examinations, which is seen by some as demanding that teachers ‘teach to the test’. 
In terms of psychological contract theory, this would be a classic case of potential ‘breach’, 
and the response would be for management to reframe the contract, possibly by informing 
teachers of the relatively higher levels of pupil attainments in other local schools, and in 
other regions of the world, such as East Asia. In contrast, approaching the process from the 
point of view of integrative bargaining, one would look for evidence of steps to reconcile 
differences in priorities between classroom and head teachers and signs of a process of 
compromise. This appears to have happened in a significant number of schools, between a 
quarter and a third, which have successfully implemented the new system of performance 
management for schools (see Marsden and Belfield, 2006). The negotiation of change in the 
teachers’ zone of acceptance in these schools is explained below using a simple 
diagrammatic presentation of some of the options and how the compromise could be 
reached. 
 
Before the current management reforms in schools, there was a broad consensus in schools 
about the goals of education in schools, and about the desirable balance between education 
in the wider sense, and the exam results that help former students get jobs. This is not 
surprising because most head teachers start their careers in the classroom. However, the 
development of the quasi market in which schools have to attract students has increased the 
pressure on schools, and on their management, to do more to ensure good exam results. 
About half of the schools responding reported that, in response to ‘league table’ pressures, 
they had directed more resources towards subjects covered by tests, towards increased 
academic content of courses, and towards teaching test-taking skills. Given that the largest 
single resource at the school’s disposal is the time of its classroom teachers, this implies 
redirecting their time allocation and their classroom priorities. Such a change of priorities 
has to involve the active agreement of classroom teachers. School management is unlikely 
to succeed in imposing such changes top-down because it cannot easily monitor fine grain 
reallocation of time between classroom activities. Often it is not in a position to do so 
because it lacks the necessary knowledge of subject matter and relevant teaching methods, 
a point acknowledged by the school inspectorate in its study of performance appraisal in 
schools (Ofsted, 1996 §15), and because of the lack of a clear relationship between 
teachers’ efforts and exam outcomes, the ‘imprecise’ nature of teachers’ work. For all these 
reasons, new objectives that are not accepted by classroom teachers are likely to remain a 
fiction in the classroom. 
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 Figure 1 provides a simple diagrammatic example to bring out key features of the 
renegotiation, and in particular the likely choices of pay-offs associated with different 
conditions. In the left hand panel of Figure 1, the teachers’ initial time budget is shown by 
line AB. At point A, all hours are devoted to teaching ‘test elements’ in the subject, and at 
point B, all hours are devoted to ‘non test’ elements. Most teachers recognise the need for a 
balance, and let us suppose this is given at point X, with equal amounts of time devoted to 
test elements and to wider aspects of the subject matter. Under the pressure from league 
tables, and government exhortation to raise exam attainments, the school’s management 
want to shift the balance towards test elements, and to move, say, to point X’, with h1 hours 
devoted to test teaching. The classroom teachers’ utility function is shown by contour lines 
S-1 and S0. These represent the satisfaction they get from giving what they feel is a good 
education to their students. This rises as we move north east from the origin. At point X, 
classroom teachers feel they are giving the right balance for a good education, but in their 
view, the new allocation of their time to test elements is inferior. A simple bargaining 
compromise, half-way between X and X’, might seem an obvious solution, but the risk is 
that neither side will be happy, and for the reasons above, even that may prove hard for 
management to enforce. The outcome looks very similar to distributive bargaining, except 
that instead of pay, the parties are compromising on the satisfaction of running a successful 
school, and that of providing students with a balanced education. 
 
Such a solution misses the problem-solving dimension of integrative bargaining, shown in 
the right hand panel of Figure 1. Are there resources the school’s management could apply 
in order to ease the time budget constraint? If teachers were to spend less time in ‘stationery 
management’ and other peripheral activities, they would have more time to devote to 
classroom teaching. Similarly, if the school could provide extra support and professional 
development, then teachers may be able to teach both elements more effectively. Marsden 
and Belfield (2006) found that many schools used performance management in order to 
identify organisational support that could be given to teachers, such as easing difficult 
workloads, providing professional development, and addressing morale problems. For 
simplicity, the right hand panel focuses simply on the release of teaching time from other 
activities in order to respect classroom teachers’ views on balance, and the head teacher’s 
need for improved attainments. In the first instance, let us suppose this is done 
unconditionally, leaving teachers to use their time as they prefer. This would be equivalent 
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to moving the time budget outwards from AB to CD. Left to their own priorities, classroom 
teachers would maintain the same relative balance, and move to point Y. The school would 
get h2 hours on test elements, but still fall short of its target of h1 hours. In contrast, if the 
school were to tie use of the extra teaching hours to test elements, then it could move to 
point Z, achieving its target of h1 hours, while at the same time asking the classroom 
teachers to make a much smaller adjustment in their teaching of non-test elements. In the 
case of schools, there are two additional inducements for teachers: first, they also share in 
the success of their school and benefit from the extra resources that flow from additional 
students; and secondly, performance management also brings performance pay, which is an 
additional measure of organisational support the school can provide to those who work with 
it to achieve its goals. 
 
This example illustrates all four stages of integrative bargaining: understanding the problem 
facing schools, searching for possible solutions; selecting the best option, with reference to 
each party’s own objectives; and agreeing on implementation. In this case, the teachers’ 
zone of acceptance, understood in this case in relation to the priorities attached to different 
parts of their work, has been altered, and it has been achieved through a process of 
integrative negotiation. 
 
Given the problems of monitoring mentioned earlier, one might ask how management 
could make this agreement stick. Part of the answer lies in the integrative negotiation itself, 
and its search for a solution that fits as far as possible with the objectives of both parties. 
Part no doubt also comes from peer pressures from other teachers engaged in the same 
process, and who feel that the objectives of their own agreements would be jeopardised by 
colleagues who backslide. One piece of evidence that these agreements did stick where 
integrative bargaining underpinned performance management is that the schools which 
appeared to practice it most systematically tended to see their pupil attainments rising faster 
than the average (Marsden and Belfield 2006). 
 
Another question relates to whether this should take place at the individual, the school or 
the national level. The national level makes little sense because it cannot deal with the 
detailed nature of teachers’ work activities, and by its very nature, the zone of acceptance is 
informal, and would lose much of its flexibility if it were codified into a national 
agreement. Conceivably, in a small school or one with a very high level of cohesiveness 
8
among its teachers, it could take place at school level for all teachers simultaneously. 
However, the zone of acceptance really goes to the core of the authority relationship, and 
therefore it is often best to address it by means of individual level negotiation between 
employees and their line managers. Moreover, although the technical aspects of the search 
for solutions may be public knowledge, the preferences of the two parties and their 
respective strengths are only discovered in the process of negotiation when people are faced 
with real rather than theoretical choices. 
 
There are several hooks between this process and the collective level, which will be 
explored in section 3. These concern the design and establishment of a framework within 
which such negotiation may take place, and its degree of procedural justice. In the case of 
many schools, this has been provided by the new system of performance management 
established in 2000, although it should be stressed that not all schools have taken this 
opportunity (Marsden and Belfield, 2006). They also concern institutional resources, legal 
and collective, that build people’s confidence that the negotiation will be in good faith. 
 
Health care 
A second example of how the zone of acceptance can be adapted by a form of individual 
level integrative bargaining within performance management is provided by hospital staff, 
covering employees with a wider range of skill levels than in the case of teachers, thus 
extending the argument beyond highly skilled categories. It draws on one of the NHS 
hospital trusts studied by Marsden and French (1998), and which was one of the small 
number of trusts to adopt performance pay when they moved to local pay determination in 
the mid-1990s. As in schools, the basic framework was set up by management, and through 
the appraisal and goal-setting process, it provides scope for individual negotiation of the 
integrative kind.4
                                                 
4 . The hospital was an NHS trust providing general and acute care services. It introduced its 
performance bonus system and performance management as part of the move to local pay 
determination in January 1994. Management implemented the new pay system. For current staff, 
the move to the new system from the established Whitley pay scales and conditions was voluntary. 
The move was compulsory for new hires and those promoted. Although implemented by 
management, at the time of Marsden and French’s survey, the scheme was operated in close 
consultation with the trade unions, and there was a grievance procedure. The authors presented 
their findings to a joint seminar of management and staff representatives. At the time of the survey, 
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 One of the aims of the performance management system had been to support more flexible 
work patterns such as those required for multi-skilled care teams. These were felt to be 
were better adapted to the unpredictable timing of patients’ needs, and an essential 
component of a more patient-centred approach. A key obstacle was that different categories 
of staff had their zones of acceptance drawn in different ways and supported by different 
principles, and there was a special problem in relation to management’s discretion to use 
staff time. One example, given by the HR Director who had introduced performance 
management, was that some categories of nurses worked continuously all week, such as 
ward nurses, whereas others, such as physiotherapists, worked Monday to Friday, with 
premium payments for working overtime and unsocial hours. This made it difficult to 
organise teams to provide continuity of care because the unsocial hours for the latter 
category were more expensive. Similar concerns were raised at the time by the Nurses’ Pay 
Review Body,5 and indeed were acknowledged by staff at the hospital. 
 
Part of the solution to this problem involved harmonising the pay system so that it 
supported compatible zones of acceptance for both categories of staff so that multi-skilled 
teams could operate more effectively. Thus the trust’s new pay system scrapped payment of 
special allowances for unsocial hours, in return for adjustments to basic pay and the 
introduction of a performance bonus whose absolute size was determined by how well the 
hospital achieved its objectives, and which was payable to satisfactory and good 
performers. A protocol for withholding all or part of the bonus included criteria such as 
persistent short-term absence, persistent lateness or poor time keeping, and persistent 
errors, omissions or mistakes. Clearly, the first three of these would interfere with the 
smooth operation of team-working and continuity of care. Such relatively objective criteria 
were chosen so as to avoid any direct link between performance pay, and goal-setting and 
appraisal. Disputes could be dealt with by the hospital’s existing grievance procedure. Thus 
one element of renegotiation came with the choice of whether to opt into the new system or 
to remain on the national ‘Whitley’ pay scales. 
                                                                                                                                                     
in summer 1996, a little over half of non-medical staff were on local, trust, contracts. The scheme 
was designed to be cost neutral. 
 
5  Nurses’ Pay Review Body Report 1995 (§64 and §67). 
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 For the present argument, the more important element lay in the parallel development of 
performance appraisal and goal setting. This applied to all staff, whereas the performance 
bonus was payable only to those on the new pay scales. As described in management 
documents, performance management comprised clarifying work roles, setting goals, 
planning personal development and regular reviewing. Managers and staff were encouraged 
to discuss the purpose of the job, its main activities, responsibilities, resources and so on, 
and whether the job description needed revision. They were also encouraged to ‘jointly 
develop, goals, tasks or objectives’ which facilitate achievement of the job’s purpose, and 
to establish a personal development plan. Bearing in mind the number of staff who would 
be less qualified than teachers and enjoy less autonomy in their jobs, one can nevertheless 
identify elements of integrative bargaining in this case as well. The parties consider the 
purpose of the job and its contribution to the objectives of the hospital, which are 
underlined by the hospital-wide performance bonus; they discuss options, and agree to 
objectives for the coming period, and agree to the provision of organisational support such 
as skill development. Performance management provided the hospital’s managers with the 
means to discuss how greater team working and more flexible time use would affect 
individual work roles, and to discuss and evaluate how they were bedding down. Some of 
this could be done in groups, but some elements of individual employees’ work patterns are 
better discussed in a one-to-one environment. This might be particularly so in cases where 
team-working and continuity of care conflict with employees’ external obligations, such as 
might manifest themselves in problems of absenteeism and time-keeping – potential 
conditions for withholding the bonus. 
 
The old system of special payments for unsocial and overtime hours gave the employer 
some flexibility to vary working time, while protecting employees against unreasonable 
variations in their workloads. It is an example of the benchmarks signalling the boundaries 
of the employee’s zone of acceptance. The rules are clear and unambiguous, and can be 
enforced easily even in low-trust work environments. Nevertheless, it frequently conflicts 
with team working, such as in this case. The unsocial hours model is illustrated in the left 
hand panel of Figure 2 which is adapted from the standard analysis of overtime working 
(e.g. Hamermesh and Rees, 1993). The total hours available in a given week from the 
‘representative employee’ are shown on the horizontal axis. Weekly wages are shown on 
the vertical axis, starting at the ‘reservation wage’, below which the employee would 
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choose to work elsewhere, and so supply no hours. The employee satisfaction curves show 
the trade offs between hours worked and weekly pay that give the employee the same level 
of satisfaction. When offered the basic hourly rate, he or she is willing to work 37 hours 
(point C), but would be willing to provide additional overtime hours and move to point E if 
requested by the employer, as shown by the movement onto a higher curve (S1). Working 
additional hours, at premium rates, has to be agreed with the employee. In this particular 
case, the employee’s zone of acceptance is made variable by the offer of additional pay for 
the extra duties. 
 
The new system avoids the rigid division between unsocial, overtime, and normal hours, 
and supports the greater flexibility of labour use that management were seeking. The right 
hand panel of Figure 2 seeks to represent the thinking behind the performance bonus and 
performance management, as explained by the hospital’s HR Director. It superimposes the 
graphs of the old and new systems. Line AD shows the new average weekly earnings over a 
period of time, including the performance bonus, and line AF shows the same figure 
without the bonus. Average earnings with the bonus were pitched above the old weekly 
wage without overtime in order to attract employees to switch to the new system, the switch 
being voluntary for incumbent employees, and to compensate them for increased variability 
in their working time, which equates to an enlarged zone of acceptance. Under the new 
system, employees had two options if they joined the new scheme. They could choose to 
work more flexibly with slightly longer average hours, and get the bonus, or they could 
choose not to cooperate, such as might be revealed in persistent absence and poor time-
keeping, and risk having the bonus withdrawn. In the latter case, management’s wishes 
could also be supported by peer group pressures, especially in the light of greater 
appreciation of the trust’s objectives that the bonus and performance management were 
intended to promote. 
 
Within the new system, by drawing on evidence on the conduct of reviews from the surveys 
by Marsden and French (1998), one can see elements of individual-level integrative 
negotiation. Unfortunately, being a survey of performance pay, it tapped into the more 
general aspects of work roles and objectives that relate to the zone of acceptance rather than 
specifically to the hours dimension. The performance reviews were designed to discuss 
individual and organisational objectives, and over a third of the staff responding said that 
their reviews had increased their awareness of the trust’s objectives. This probably 
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understates the full extent of discussion of trust objectives because about 20% replied that 
they were already aware of the trust’s objectives before their review6. This is essentially a 
measure of stage one of integrative negotiation: identifying the problem, and would provide 
an essential background to a dialogue with individual employees of the organisation’s need 
for greater job level flexibility, and how their jobs contribute to this in a practical way. 
Stages two and three, on discussion of alternatives and selection of the best, are signalled 
by positive responses to questions on the discussion and clarification of work roles, 
identification of objectives and training needs, which was the case for over 70% of 
respondents who had had their performance review. The survey did not explicitly probe 
elements of give and take within the reviews such as might have signalled individual level 
negotiation, apart from the question on training, which indicates consideration of measures 
of organisational support. Nevertheless, respondents were also asked whether their review 
had been supportive, threatening, irrelevant or superficial. It could have been threatening if 
management had sought to impose targets unilaterally, which was the case for only 10% of 
replies, or it might have been deemed superficial or irrelevant if treated purely as a form-
filling exercise, respectively 25% and 13% of respondents. Perhaps one of the strongest 
signs that something significant was taking place in the reviews was that 70% of staff who 
had not had reviews in the past year said they wanted one. For the fourth stage, 
commitment to a course of action, again there is no direct indicator, except that 90% of 
those who had had a review thought they were capable of achieving their current targets 
and objectives – they would have been unlikely to agree to objectives they felt they could 
not achieve, unless under duress, and as mentioned, only 10% felt the reviews threatening.  
 
These two examples, from education and health care, were chosen to illustrate how 
performance management can provide a forum for integrative negotiation between line 
managers and individual staff about issues relating to the zone of acceptance in their jobs. 
As stressed by many observers, this zone is the key to the flexibility that employers gain 
from hiring people as employees instead of, for example, as self-employed contractors. Its 
attractiveness lies in the fact that it is informal, and does not need to be codified, although 
this makes it hard to deal with by more formal mechanisms such as employment law and 
                                                 
6 The percentages cited in the text on these questions are higher than those published in the 
appendix of Marsden and French (1998) because they exclude those who had not had their 
performance review and so could not report about their direct personal experience.  
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collective agreements. On the other hand, if it is informal, then it can be hard for 
organisations to orchestrate systematic changes in the zone of acceptance across many 
employees in order to establish new ways of working. In this respect, performance 
management is one means by which management can achieve a coordinated dialogue with 
individual employees across an organisation. As can be seen from the evidence of these two 
case studies, PM is capable of focusing on these issues, and of approaching them as a form 
of integrative negotiation. From this, it derives much of its legitimacy in the eyes of 
employees, and hence the positive assessments by them. Nevertheless, the cases also show 
a considerable range of effectiveness, from what look like attempts at top-down imposition 
of goals to a real two-way discussion and problem-solving. Along this scale, there is a 
corresponding variation in the strength of employee voice. The next part of this paper looks 
at the relationship between such individual level instances of employee voice and its more 
familiar collective manifestations. 
 
 
3. Role of Collective Representation: Managing the Link with Distributional Issues 
 
The potential support collective voice can offer to employee-level integrative bargaining 
may be considered from three angles: the separation of distributive from integrative issues; 
the design of integrative processes such as in performance management; and improving 
procedural justice. 
 
It is clear from Walton and McKersie’s emphasis on the parties’ respective objectives and 
preferences, that both the integrative and distributive forms are instances of bargaining, and 
that the boundary is a matter of choice. A well-known example is given by Freeman and 
Lazear’s (1995) study of integrative bargaining by German works councils. They show that 
their cooperation with management is greatly enhanced when distributional issues are taken 
out of their remit and handed over to industry unions. In terms of the two case studies in 
this article, the operation of performance management arguably was assisted by the 
separation of major distributive issues. In the hospital case, the HR Director had opted for a 
trust-wide bonus instead of individual performance pay in order to enable appraisal and 
goal setting to concentrate on problem-solving issues. In this case, it was a management 
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choice. In schools, the reduction in the prominence of pay in performance management, 
largely by reducing the degree of selectivity, came under pressure from classroom, head 
teachers, and their respective associations. 
 
Collective representation can play a key part in the design of performance management 
systems so that they will engage employees. In the two case studies, management needed to 
know what designs and what levels of reward would be needed in order to attract 
employees into their respective schemes. The decision was all the more critical because 
management had to get the broad design right first time. If standards are too generous, it is 
usually costly to buy them out later, and if terms are not sufficiently attractive, too few staff 
will show any interest. The problem highlighted by the integrative bargaining approach is 
that management needs to discover the preferences and objectives of its staff. In terms of 
Figures 1 and 2, it needs to know their utility functions if it is to obtain the response it 
desires: a sufficient number of hours devoted to teaching test elements, and sufficient 
flexibility in working time to support effective operation of care teams. 
 
The question is how should management obtain this information? Here surely there is a role 
for collective voice, because individual teachers and hospital staff often find it difficult to 
articulate their preferences, and to relate them to those of their work colleagues. 
Management needs to discover not only what individual staff want, but it also needs the 
bigger picture across all staff so that the best judgement can be made for the design of a 
model which will apply across the organisation. 
 
Negotiation with employee representatives has a number of distinct advantages. Even 
though they may not be much better informed initially than management, they have 
methods of consultation with those they represent, and they can organise a debate in which 
their members become better acquainted with the issues, and the likely implications for 
their work. The members themselves can also work out which scenarios are realistic, and 
discover how their own views relate to those of their colleagues: what is the general feeling 
about more flexible working time, or about the balance between test and non-test elements? 
The negotiation is a learning process for all parties involved. Because the process runs over 
a period of time, management can float ideas and learn about staff reactions, and the new 
system can be refined and adapted before its final implementation. 
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The introduction and adaptation of performance management for teachers provides a good 
illustration of this process. Perhaps unusually, the system was introduced progressively 
from 2000, with teachers being concerned only with progression onto the first step of the 
new system in 2000-01, and questions about further progression up their new pay scale and 
the link with performance being left until later. No one would be eligible for further 
movement until after 2001. That left time for further discussion of the scheme’s design. 
Two points in particular had generated a lot of concern at the time of initial 
implementation: how the element of pupil progress in appraisals should be handled, and 
whether the performance criteria for movement up the new performance-related pay scale 
should be broad and open to everyone capable, or whether they should be increasingly 
demanding at each step – whether or not progression should be ‘tapered’. 
 
The initial fear of many teachers and their unions was that ‘pupil progress’ would be 
narrowly measured by exam results so that teachers’ own progression would be tied to a 
crude metric of this nature. Such fears were widely emphasised by the teachers’ unions, and 
as the government rolled out the new scheme, it provided good practice illustrations of how 
pupils’ test results could be used in a more constructive manner, such as using test results to 
identify problems that need attention. Given the degree of autonomy enjoyed by school-
level management, and the competition to attract students, many teachers feared that, 
despite Education Department guidance, their own heads would tie performance 
management crudely to exam results. The second area of concern was that performance 
standards would be made increasingly demanding at each stage of progression. This was 
the view proposed initially by the Education Secretary. Alternatively, they could be more 
like a ‘driving test’, as one union official put it, based on a level of achievement to which 
all competent and conscientious teachers could aspire. Both issues were intensively 
debated. In the event, as shown earlier, in a great many of the schools the CEP surveyed, 
performance management was used supportively. On ‘tapering’, the unions and the 
Education Department reached agreement in 2004 that applied a version of the ‘driving 
test’ model, while keeping options open for a stronger degree of selectivity for entry to the 
top grade of classroom teachers (Marsden and Belfield 2005). 
 
Thus, the teachers’ organisations appear to have played a significant role in adapting the 
new framework so that it better reflected teachers’ preferences, and gave rise to a system 
that could be more credibly and effectively operated in schools. It was more credible 
16
because it reflected classroom and head teachers’ views about the practicalities in the use of 
measures of classroom performance, and more effective because this then laid a basis on 
which new objectives could be discussed and agreed. 
 
The third contribution of collective voice to individual level negotiation concerns the need 
for procedural justice if performance management is to work effectively. The damaging 
effects of perceived unfairness with which performance management is operated were 
noted by the government’s Makinson Report (2000) into performance management in four 
large government departments and agencies. Makinson observed that although there was 
widespread acceptance of the principle of linking pay to performance, far higher than 
among teachers, there was widespread disenchantment with the way it had operated. Many 
staff thought that line-managers were biased in their ratings of performance, and that top 
management manipulated ratings in order to save money. Far from motivating staff, the 
systems were felt to be divisive. Key causes of perceived divisiveness in these 
organisations were found to lie in poor quality appraisals and goal setting, and in whether 
employees had sufficient scope in their jobs to improve their performance (Marsden 2004: 
Table 2). Poor quality appraisals and goal setting mean that employees feel they have a 
reduced chance of a good rating even if they perform well. Likewise, if management fails to 
take account of the nature of their work and the scope it offers to vary performance levels, 
employees will also unfairly treated. Such considerations go to the heart of concerns about 
procedural justice as outlined by Cropanzano and Greenberg (1997) who argue that the 
incentive effects of performance schemes sought by management can be undermined just as 
much by unfairly operated procedures as by disagreeable distributional outcomes. 
 
For similar reasons, one can see that procedural justice is also critical for the achievement 
of effective agreements. If the design of goal setting and appraisal are inappropriate to the 
kind of jobs employees are doing, then they are likely to feel that they have little chance of 
a fair reward for their effort. Employees may even be reluctant to enter into the first stages 
of integrative negotiation if they feel that management is not acting in good faith. Likewise, 
if they believe that their line-managers are biased or incapable of assessing performance 
fairly, then they will be reluctant to accept the new terms, or if they accept them under 
duress, they will not commit to them, thus undermining the last of the four stages of 
integrative bargaining. These are all important if the outcome of renegotiation is to be 
mutually agreeable to both parties. 
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 As management cannot act credibly as their own judge and jury in such cases, there is a 
case for supporting the renegotiation component within performance management by 
means of various forms of employee representation. These would relate to such issues as 
the adaptation of performance management to the kind of work and job roles in question, 
and to the actions of both line managers in setting goals and assessing performance, and the 
criteria for good performance. Whereas management appeared to have fallen short on many 
of these counts in the government departments studied by Marsden and French (1998), in 
the case of teachers, a greater degree of success had been achieved after four years of 
operation. Thus whereas the return survey of Inland Revenue staff five years after the first 
one showed increased negative feeling among employees, in the case of teachers, there is 
evidence of an increase in positive judgements of performance management by both 
classroom and head teachers (Marsden and Belfield 2005). A critical factor seems to be the 
way in which performance management has adapted to the needs of schools, something the 
authors found that teachers had attributed largely to the action of their associations. 
 
Thus, although performance management can be seen as a form of employer chosen 
employee voice at the individual level, there is good reason to believe that its effectiveness 
can be enhanced by more traditional forms of collective employee voice. These can help to 
keep separate distributive and integrative issues, inform the design of performance 
management systems, and improve the procedural justice with which they operate. 
 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
This essay has sought to argue that an important part of performance management in the 
organisations considered here relates to the renegotiation of performance standards and 
work priorities among incumbent employees, and where there is sufficient employee input, 
it should be considered a form of employee voice. It can provide employers with a form of 
employee voice to deal with periodic renegotiation. As Coase (1937) argued, when 
employees enter an employment relationship, they agree to let management determine the 
content of their work only within certain limits. From time to time, these limits need to be 
updated, and given that the employment relationship is built on agreement reached in a 
market transaction, the logical way to change terms is also by agreement. While the theme 
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of contract renegotiation has been dealt with quite extensively within the Economics 
literature (see for example, Malcomson 1997, Teulings and Hartog 1998), its primary focus 
has been on pay rather than on management of the zone of acceptance. 
 
Drawing on the classic study of labour negotiations by Walton and McKersie (1965), it has 
been argued that this process of renegotiation is akin to integrative bargaining, although 
there remains always a distributive element. The two case studies provide a concrete 
illustration of what constitutes this process. They showed that employees were aware of 
many aspects of the integrative process identified by Walton and McKersie. Comparison 
with the experiences the large government departments covered by Makinson’s review 
(2000), suggests that there a larger proportion of staff experienced performance 
management as a top down process, even though there too it appears to have played a 
significant role in a renegotiation of the effort bargain. Although the case studies have 
focused on one-step changes, performance management may also play a longer-term role 
by enabling management to achieve continuous adaptation of individual employees’ work 
priorities and work methods, thus enabling a form of continuous renegotiation. 
 
Much of the success of this process depends upon a suitable framework at the 
organisational level. It has been argued that although performance management focuses on 
individual employees and their relationship with management, collective representation can 
increase transactional efficiency by helping management find the design that best fits 
employees’ preferences and judgements. It can also support the procedural justice of its 
operation that is the key to continuous improvement through performance management. 
The evidence from the CEP studies indicates that performance management does not 
always succeed in fulfilling this function of renegotiation, but that it has done in a 
significant number of organisational units. 
 
More generally, even though collective forms of voice have declined in their coverage in 
recent years, the employment relationship continues to govern the work of the great 
majority of employees across the OECD countries. This is based on a contract, and on an 
initial negotiation and agreement between employer and employee. The terms of this 
contract need to be periodically revised, and one can anticipate that employers will need to 
compensate the decline in collective voice by increased use of channels of individual voice 
which can support this renegotiation. Even though the case studies discussed in this essay 
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come from the public sector, there is little reason to expect that employees’ concerns about 
fairness and the need for terms to be mutually acceptable should be radically different in 
private organisations as there is a good deal of labour mobility between the two sectors. 
The WERS 2004 data cited at the start showed that performance appraisal is widely used in 
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